PENTAGON — On Sunday, U.S. Africa Command’s Major General Kenneth Ekman was one of the last two U.S. service members to leave Niger as part of America’s military withdrawal, following the country’s July 2023 coup. Per an agreement reached by the U.S. and Niger in May, the only American service members that remain in the country are those securing the U.S. Embassy in the capital, Niamey.
The general, who served as AFRICOM’s director of strategy, plans and programs before focusing solely on West Africa, spent the last few months methodically overseeing the withdrawal of about 1,100 American service members, along with U.S. weapons, drones and equipment that had been staged for years in two U.S. military bases in Niger. The task was completed on time and within the parameters set by the host nation, but the withdrawal has created a massive hole in the United States’ ability to monitor the growing violent extremist threat.
In an exclusive interview at the Pentagon on Thursday, Ekman explained how the new U.S. footprint in West Africa is beginning to take shape to continue fighting a shared threat.
Below are highlights from his discussion with VOA Pentagon correspondent Carla Babb, edited for brevity and clarity:
VOA: On what Nigerians should expect in terms of a partnership with the US military:
Major General Kenneth Ekman: I think that remains to be seen. … I think the starting impetus will be reflecting on the 15 years of very mutually beneficial partnership that we had up to this point. We have shed blood together, right? We have pursued their most acute security threats together, and so you can’t erase that history … It would be really helpful if the Nigerians took the first step — they asked us to leave after all — their first step on what that government and the military that serves them would like next in a U.S. security partnership. And then it will be bounded. What I mean by that is, it’s going to take a while for it ever to be what it was on July 25, 2023, which was the day prior to the coup.
There are some obstacles–everything from the request that we withdraw, to our turnover of bases and facilities and equipment, to the fact that coup sanctions, Section 7008 sanctions, have been imposed against the junta. And so all of that combines to limit the “what next.”
We still have shared security objectives. How we will pursue them, either together or apart, as a consequence of the withdrawal remains to be seen, but we wanted to make sure we kept all options on the table.
VOA: On repercussions concerning military partnerships and training exercises with countries who’ve undergone a coup:
Ekman: There are absolutely repercussions. Because when they’re omitted, they lose everything from the chance to interact in a region that’s becoming increasingly dis-integrated, right, to the chance to practice and practice at a high level within the context or the scenario of the exercise. So it is a net loss, right? It’s a net loss for the region, and it’s a loss for each of those individual countries as they are excluded.
VOA: On increased U.S. military presence in other West African nations:
Ekman: What you’re talking about is that layer of forces, most of which came from Niger, that we reposition around the Sahel. If our presence in Niger allowed us to go inside out, relative to the Sahelian based VEO (violent extremist organization) threat, we now have to revert to going outside in … Countries like Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Ghana, Benin, Chad, our access to them and the degree to which they want to partner with us will influence how we go outside in.
We’re at a different phase with each of those countries. What I mean is, each partner has their own unique security concerns. They also have their own respective tolerance and willingness to abide the presence of U.S. forces. So in some cases, we moved some forces well prior to the Niger coup, because that’s where the threat was going. We were invited early on, and whether it was a small SOF (special operations forces) team or an ISR (intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance) platform, we moved them months ago. The larger question is, and it’s a policy question, where, and if we establish significant presence of forces, probably on a partner base, serving alongside them, doing everything from command and control to projecting things like ISR and personnel recovery, to sustaining them and to medically treating them. That is something where we’re not there yet, and no agreements have been made.
There are some cases where, for now, we’re definitely not (establishing a significant force presence). So that’s true in Nigeria. We have a very clear message from them … Likewise in Ghana.
The ones where things are still kind of under consideration, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, those were, what we want to do is, within the partners’ needs, support their partner-led, U.S.-enabled counter VEO ops.
VOA: On U.S. military movements, specifically, refurbishing an airfield in Benin to accommodate U.S. aircraft, sending special forces to Ivory Coast and bringing U.S. forces back to Chad:
Ekman: The most lethal violent extremist organization threat in the world resides in West Africa, and it resides in the Sahel. It’s also spreading. The primary direction of travel is to the southwest, so well-prior to the Niger coup we were already working with partners on what they needed with regards to U.S. presence and capabilities. In the Benin case, we started that a while ago. In the Cote d’Ivoire case, it’s been really post-coup (in Niger). So each of them is on their own timeline as we work with them… We did have some forces in Mali and Burkina Faso. We had special forces teams there as well. And given our current relationship, that’s just not something that we can do, and so we had some forces available who needed to move and there were requirements in other countries. The specifics beyond that kind of remain to be seen.
VOA: But the Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) case, the (U.S.) special forces were moved from Niger to there?
Ekman: That’s correct.
VOA: OK, and then the airfield (refurbishment) in Benin (to accommodate U.S. aircraft) was started a little prior, but then also worked on during.
Ekman: That’s it.
A consistent request that we receive from all partners is intel sharing, right? And so that’s something that we can offer uniquely… It is a common currency from which everyone benefits.
VOA: That has diminished.
Ekman: The region has become more opaque. Absolutely.
We did remove about 70 U.S. Special Forces personnel (from Chad) at the end of April. That was at their request. They asked us to leave. An election was coming and we obliged. That’s what partners do. Since then, they had a successful election on May 6. And so in the aftermath of that, they’ve started asking us, well, what can we do together?
Our goal is to do something less than we had there before. We had a headquarters there before, but we have reached an agreement on the return of a limited number of special forces personnel. It is a presidential decision. So these are big policy decisions. It was a presidential decision by President Deby, but the decision is made, and now we’re working through the specifics on how we return… His decision was conveyed to us in just recent weeks. Chad is really important because… it’s an outside-in strategy. And the direction of approach from Chad is immensely important. They’ve also been a significant contributor to Sahelian security.
VOA: On the effect that losing Niger has on region counterterrorism efforts:
Ekman: If there was one country that was most important on our ability to address Sahelian VEO problems or the Sahelian VEO challenge, it was Niger. So, for one, of Niger, I talked about it as a strategic setback, (but) the degree to which that setback endures ties to how we reposition and then what our partners want to do with us… That is a snapshot in time. All is not lost.
VOA: On concerns that Niger could fall to violent extremist organizations:
Ekman: Their risks have definitely gone up. Their ability to confront extremist organizations, intel sharing, partnership with our and other allied forces, it’s gotten worse. So they are a capable force… the degree to which they can handle the problem themselves remains to be seen. It is a fact that in Niger, violent extremist attacks have become more lethal. That’s a fact. Since the coup on July 26, 2023. They’ve got fewer resources and fewer partners.
VOA: Have you seen any evidence, or heard anything from your engagements about JNIM starting to collaborate with some of the ISIS elements (in West Africa)?
Ekman: I think that one varies. For what I can talk about in here, some cases they collaborate, some cases they compete, and that often manifest down to the local level.
VOA: On Russia’s military presence in Niger:
Ekman: In the Nigerian case, that presence is actually quite small. The Nigerians signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia related to security cooperation two governments ago. And so they fly Russian equipment. They drive Russian equipment. There’s nothing new there. The Russian trainers who showed up? Didn’t see much of them while we were there. And so, to date, Russian presence in Niger has been quite limited… We caution them of the malign impacts of partnering, particularly with Russian PMCs who have yet to help anybody from a security perspective. And then their methods are abhorrent to us, OK? And so that’s where we, we encourage them to draw the line.
VOA: On whether terrorists in the Sahel now have the capacity to try external operations:
Ekman: Given the lack of access that we have, given the lack of ISR, our ability to gage… the trend in their development of capability and will, it’s become more difficult.
Our access and our partnerships have diminished. It’s a tough operational problem.
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